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)

\
\

No.11189
Case

BRIEF OF RESPO,NDENTS
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The Statement of Facts by Appellants is incomplete. The primary complaint on appeal is that the evidence does not justify the judgment approving the application. Much of the supporting evidence is not
included in Appellants' Statement of Facts. In this
regard, however, we believe that the additional evidence
can be more clearly presented in answer to Appellants'
specific points on appeal.
1
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It perhaps should be noted here that both the State
Engineer and the trial court have approved the application, and we will endeavor to demonstrate that under
the controlling legal principles and the evidence presented, the order approving the application was proper.
POINT I
SECTION 73-3-8, U.C.A. 1953, AS THE SAME
WAS AMENDED IN 1939, HAS BEEN CONSTRUED BY THE COURT MANY TLMES,
AND UNDER ALL THE CASES THE COURT
HAS HELD THAT APPLICATIONS TO APPROPRIATE WATER SHOULD. BE FAVORED.
We do not deny that an applicant is required (unless the issues are restricted by stipulation or a pretri11l order) to offer evidence concerning all of the
factors set forth in Section 78-3-8, U.C.A. 1953. However, the quantum of proof required is not the same as
would be required in a regular judicial type proceeding
where the determination is res judicata, and the rights
of the parties are finally fixed. Before the amendment,
the statute required the State Engineer to inquire into
the availability of water, possible injury to prior vested
rights, and whether the appropriation would interfere
with the more beneficial use of the water. The 1939
amendment added two additional factors - is the application feasible, and was the application filed in good
faith?
There is absolutely nothing in the decided cases to
suggest that the pre-1939 requirements (which are still
2
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in the statute) are to be governed by one set of rules as
to the quantum of proof required, while the two new
requirements are to be proven by more stringent standards, nor that the rules governing the quantum of proof
have changed.
It is apparent from the cases that litigants in this
type of proceedings are quick to assert that the applicant should be required to assume the same burdens as
a plaintiff in a judicial proceeding. Thus - they argue
- applicant should be required not only to offer evidence on every element of his case as required by Shields
v. Dry Creek Irr. Co., 12 Utah 2d 98, 363 P. 2d 82, but
he should be required to establish every element by a
preponderance of the evidence. Such an argument misconceives the purpose and the nature of the permit system. The mere filing of an application to appropriate is
not an appropriation of water. The application but
takes the place of and is the preliminary notice of the
applicant's intention. Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212,
108 Pac. 1112 (1910). The approval of an application to
appropriate is only a preliminary step. It confers upon
the applicant no perfected right to the use of water. It
merely clothes the applicant with authority to proceed
and perfect, if he can, his proposed application. Little
Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 Pac.
116 (1930).

The State Engineer, in approving or rejecting an application is not adjudicating rights. He performs an
executive function. Tracy v. Bullock, 4 Utah 2d 370,
294 P. 2d 707 (1956); Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367,
3
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77 P. 2d 362 (1938); United States v. District Court of
the Fourth Judicial Dist., 121 Utah 1, 238 P. 2d 1132
(1951); Riordan v. Westwood, 115 Ut. 215, 203 P. 2d
922 (1949).
The objective of the State Engineer's office is to
maintain order and efficiency in the appropriation of
water. United States v. District Court of the Fourth
Judicial Dist., supra.
After the applicant receives his approval and after
he has been given a reasonable time for experimentation, and to complete the construction of works, the
applicant must submit proof of appropriation, (Section 73-3-16) and the State Engineer, if he is satisfied
that some appropriation has been completed, issues a
certificate of appropriation which becomes prima facie
evidence of the right. (Sec. 73-3-17)

It is perhaps understandable that litigants over
the years have sought to impose on the applicant the
burden of proving all elements of his water right by a
preponderance of the evidence, and to have the court
deny the application if the applicant didn't meet this
burden. We say that it is understandable, because the
statute does provide for notice. (Section 73-3-6.) Interested persons are given an opportunity to file written
protests. (Section 73-3-7.) The State Engineer is directed to inquire into the things enumerated in Section
73-3-8, and on the basis of these things, to approve or
reject the application. Then any person who is aggrieved by the decision can appeal the decision to the
4
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courts. (Section 73-3-14.) The foregoing procedure
takes the form of a judicial determination, but the decision made by the State Engineer in approving or rejecting an application does not adjudicate rights. The
determination made is not res judicata. Neither party
can rely on the determination in subsequent litigation
over the water rights. The State Engineer should not
carry the determination he makes at the approval stage
into the proof of appropriation procedures. In performing this executive function of approving an application, the court has again and again held that new
applications should be favored, that doubts should be
resolved in favor of approval, that the court should not
require the applicant to prove the elements of his appropriation by a preponderance of the evidence, and
that only where it appears affirmatively that there is no
reasonable basis for belief that any appropriation can
be perfected should the application be denied. The
rulings of the court to this effect are uniform, and there
has been no change whatsoever in regard to the quantum of proof required because of the 1939 amendment.
This, we submit, is amply supported by the following
decisions from the Utah Supreme Court:
We first direct the court's attention to United
States v. District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
121 Utah 1, 238 P. 2d 1132 (1951). There the court describes the function of the State Engineer's office, notes
that in approving or rejecting an application, the
State Engineer is not adjudicating anything, and
that the applicant should not be required by a "pre-

5
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ponderance of the evidence" to prove at the application stage that he can do all that his application
proposes. The court notes that he should be given an
opportunity to experiment and to demonstrate what he
can do, and that the law should not cut off the possibility of the applicant establishing some valuable rights
simply because he cannot at the time his application
is heard prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he can do everything his application proposes. Said
the court:
''The Engineer in granting an application
does not determine that the applicant's rights
are prior to the rights of the protestant but only
finds there is reason to believe that the application may be granted and some water beneficially
used thereunder without interfering with the
rights of others. Under such a holding, the Engineer rejects applications only when it is clear
that the applicant can establish no valuable rights
thereunder, he does not adjudicate claims but decides only that there is probable cause to believe
that applicant may be able to establish rights under his application without impairing the rights
of others. Such a decision is administrative in
nature and purpose and the decision of the court
on review, except for the formalities of the trial
and judgment is of the same nature and for the
same purpose. The object of the engineer's office
is to maintain order and efficiency in the appropriation, distribution and conservation of water
and to allow as much water to be beneficially used
as possible. So construed, the law provides a
period of experimentation during which ways and
means may be sought to make beneficial use of
more water under the application before the
rights of the parties are finally adjudicated. If

6
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we were to finally adjudicate applicant's right to
change or to appropriate water at the time that
such application was rejected or approved, he
would get only such rights as he could establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that he could
use beneficially without interfering with the rights
of others and in such hearing he would not have
the benefit of any opportunity to experiment and
demonstrate what he could do. Such a system
would cut off the possibility of establishing ma;ny
valuable rights without a chance to demonstrate
what could be done." (Emphasis added)
Another case which again emphasizes the executive
nature of the State Engineer's decision is Tracy v. Bullock, 4 Utah 2d 370, 294 P. 2d 707 (1956), where the rule
is stated as follows :
''Before considering those questions we note
that this is not an action to adjudicate the rights
of the parties to the use of this water. It is merely an appeal from the Engineer's decision and requires only the determination of whether the application should be approved or rejected. The
Engineer in making that decision exercises an
executive function, he only determines whether
there is reason to believe from the evidence that
there are unappropriated waters in the proposed
source which can be appropriated to a beneficial
use without impairing existing rights or interfering with a more beneficial use and whether the
proposed plan is feasible and within the financial
ability of the applicant. Our decision has only the
effect of authorizing or denying the applicant the
right to proceed with his plan to appropriate the
water the same as though it were made by the
Engineer without an appeal.''

7
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In both of the two cases noted abow, the Utah
Court cite~ with approval, its earlier decision in Eardley v. Terry, 94 1.!tah 367, 77 P. 2d 362 (1938). The
Eardley case was decided before the 1939 amendment
referred to by Appellants. However, it has been consistently cited by the Supreme Court since 1939 as
correctly setting forth the rule to govern the State Engineer and the court on appeal in approving or rejecting
an application.
The Eardley case was dealing with the quantum of
proof necessary to prove the three things then covered
by Section 73-3-8, as it existed before the 1939 amendment, to-wit, the availability of water, possible injury
to prior rights, and possible interference with the more
benefic>ial use of the water. The court squarely held that
the applicant did not need to pro'e these specified things
with the same quantum of proof as is required when
the applicant submits proof of appropriation. It did say
that if the section ·were read by itself, it would appear
that the State Engineer, in rendering his decision,
should impose upon the applicant the same burdens of
proof as should be imposed upon him if this were a final
disposition of all questions growing out of the filing of
the application. Howe\er, said the court, the section does
not stand alone. Sections 100-3-16 and 100-3-17 (which
are now Sections 73-3-16 and 73-3-17) must be considered in connection with Section 8. Sections 16 and 17
contemplate that when the works have been completed
and the water has been applied to beneficial use, the
applicant must submit proof of appropriation. The
8
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court noted that the State Engineer's determination, at
the approval stage, does not adjudicate the respective
rights of the parties, and really has no efficacy, except
to allow the applicant to proceed.
The court then dealt squarely with the quantum of
proof, and said that it appeared clear to the court that
the Legislature intended that when an application is filed,
the State Engineer is called upon to determine preliminarily ·whether there is probable cause to believe that any
appropriation can be perfected. If he determines that
there is such a probability, the application should be approved. The court then expressly said that it did not
believe that the Legislature intended that the applicant,
"must prove to the State Engineer, when his
application is up for approval or rejection, by the
same kind and quantum of proof that would be
required were he making final proof, that he can
make an appropriation. Such a construction, in
view of Sections 100-3-16 and 100-3-17, would require him to take proof t"·ire, once in advance
of and once after the construction of the necessary
works . . . . "
The court went on to note that because the approval
is not res judicata,
''no one can be hurt by this procedure, while at
the same time it permits the development of our
water resources to the utmost." (page 376)

In Whitmore

Welch, 114 Utah 558, 201 P. 2d 954
(1949), the court was concerned with an appropriation
for power purposes, and there was a dispute about the
stretch of the stream which could be appropriated. The
v,

9
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protestant argued that the application should have been
denied, because the point of return specified in the application was downstream from protestant 's point of intake.
The court approved the application, imposing a condition that the water be returned so that protestant could
receive it. Protestant argued on appeal that the application should have been rejected, because of the conflict.
The court held otherwise, and said:
''To accord the meaning for which appellants
contend to the second enumerated condition, to
the approva1 of an application to appropriate,
would place upon such applicant the uwwarranted
burden of determining precisely the amount of
unappropriated water remaining in the proposed
source . ... Such is not the construction indicated
by the opinion of this court in Little Cottonwood
Water Co. v. Kimball, supra.'' (Emphasis added.)
In Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.
2d 748 (1944), the court was concerned with the change
application section which prohibits changes which will
impair vested rights. Again the court said that if the
section (73-3-3) is read by itself it would appear that
the State Engineer must determine the existence or nonexistence of such vested rights before he acts, and that
when he approves the change, he has necessarily found
that no vested rights will be impaired. However, said
the court, such a construction would fail to take cognizance of the purpose of our Water and Irrigation Act.
The office of the State Engineer, said the court, was not
created to adjudicate rights, but only to supervise the
appropriation of water. The court went on to say that
in Eardley v. Terry, supra, the court had considered the

10
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duty of the State Engineer in approving or denying an
application, and that the same rules applied to change
applications.
In Tanner v. Humphries, 87 Utah 164, 48 P. 2d 484,
which also was a change application case, the court held
that the applicant must make a general showing that the
change will not injure others, but that he can do this by a
general negative. The burden then moves to the person
claiming that he will be injured, to show how he would
be hurt. The court said that the applicant's statement
that the change would not adversely affect the rights of
others was a sufficient proof against a motion for a nonsuit. Said the Court:
"It would be impracticable to require the
plaintiff to ferret out all of the ways in which the
others might perchance be injured and offer proof
in negation thereof as a part of its affirmative
case. The general negative as against injury to
the protestants is sufficient to carry the case over
a motion for a nonsuit in that respect." (page
175)

In Riordan v. Westwood, 115 Utah 215, 203 P. 2d 922
( 1949), supra, the court said:

''It is not necessary that it be established that
there is unappropriated waters in this source in
order to justify the approval of the application to
appropriate, all that is necessary is that there is
reasonable ground to believe that such is the case.
Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362; Little
Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243,
289 P. 116; Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Irrigation Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108; Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P. 2d 954; Lehi
11
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Irr. Co. v. Jones, 115 Utah 136, 202 P. 2d 892. But
the approval of this application does not mean
that it is adjudicated that there is unappropriated
waters at this source. The applicant still has to
demonstrate that such is the case before a certificate of appropriation can be issued to him."
(page 231)
In Rocky Ford Irrigation Company v. Kent's Lake
Irrig. Co., et al, 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108 (1943), the
court said:
''We stated in Little Cottonwood Water Co. v.
Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116, 118, that the
State Engineer should approve an application to
appropriate water unless
" 'it clearly appears that there is no unappropriated water in the proposed source. * * *
If the question is fairly doubtful and there is
reasonable probability that a portion of the
waters are not necessary to supply existing
rights the engineer should have the power
to approve the application.' "
In Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Jones, et al, 115 Utah 136,
202 P. 2d 892 (1949), the court quoted with approval
from Eardley v. Terry, supra, and Little Cottonwood
Water Company v. Kimball, supra, and cited other cases
noted above, and then said :
"If then it is not clear that there is no unappropriated water in the proposed source and the applicant satisfies the requirements, the State Engineer should not withhold his approval.''

It is thus clear that the application should be approved if from the evidence the State Engineer (or the
court on appeal) has reason to believe that some appro12
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priation can be completed. In the language of the United
States v. District Court case, supra, "under such a
holding the Pngineer rejects applications only when it is
clear that the applicant can establish no valuable rights
thereunder,'' and the State Engineer does not adjudicate claims,
"but decides only that there is probable cause to
believe that applicant may be able to establish
rights under his application without impairing the
rights of others. The decision is administrative,
and its object is to maintain order and efficiency
in appropriations, and to allow as much water to
be beneficially used as possible.''
In the instant case the foregoing discussion may be
moot, because as we will next demonstrate, the evidence
adduced at the trial fully sustains the trial court's :findings on the three issues which were reserved by the pretrial order. We have burdened the brief by citing all of
the foregoing cases, because of Appellants' apparent contention under Point I that the 1939 amendment had the
effect of changing the rules and making it considerably
more difficult for an applicant to proceed. As the foregoing cases demonstrate, this court has continued to
apply the rules first pronounced in Little Cottonwood
Wa.ter Co. v. Kimball, supra, and Eardley v. Terry,
supra. The 1939 amendment did require that the State
Engineer inquire into feasibility, and the good faith of
the applicant, but it did not change the rule regarding
the quantum of proof required, nor obviously has it
changed the rule which favors new applications, and
resolves doubts in favor of approval.
13
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUSTAINS THE
COURT'S DETERMINATION ON ALL FACT
ISSUES SET FORTH IN THE PRE-TRIAL
ORDER.

A. Availability of U n,appropriated Water
The first issue reserved for trial in the pre-trial
order is whether there is probable cause to believe that
there is unappropriated water in the East and Middle
Forks of Beaver Creek. Considerable evidence was introduced on this issue at the trial, but Appellants apparently do not question the court's finding (Findings
7 and 8, R. 40) that there is unappropriated water. We,
therefore, will not discuss this issue in detail here. We
do note that we introduced as Exhibits 5 and 6 the daily
flow measurements on the Middle Fork and the East
Fork of Beaver Creek. We also placed in evidence as
Exhibits 8 and 10 a summation of the existing decreed
rights on these sources in both Utah and Wyoming. The
State Engineer, Mr. Lambert, testified at some length on
these decreed rights, and the total divertible flow permitted thereunder (Tr. 13-19). Mr. Proffitt plotted the
decreed rights on a series of graphs (Ex. 13), showing
the maximum water awarded by the Wyoming and Utah
decrees, and then by plotting the daily stream flow on the
charts, showed the periods of time each year when the
streams exceeded the decreed rights.
He also totalled the amount of water in acre feet
available each year in these two sources from 1948 to
1962, (Ex. 12).
14
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Mr. Hanks testified that there is always excess
water (Tr. 71), and nearly every one of the Appellants,
on cross-examination, admitted there is excess water at
times. Mr. Wadsworth (Tr. 130) said that there would
be excess water in June; Mr. Phillips (Tr. 134) said he
didn't know that the application would hurt him; Mr.
Bullock (Tr. 142) said that in April and May water flows
to Henrys Fork and "I imagine" this could be stored
without hurting anyone; Mr. Hickey (Tr. 157) said that
every year water flows to Henrys Fork.
There is thus adequate evidence to support the trial
court's finding that there is unappropriated water.

B. Injury to Vested Rights
The second pre-trial issue was whether the water
could be diverted and stored without injury to or conflict with prior rights. The primary contention made at
the trial was that in the wintertime the flow of the
streams is small and if substantial quantities were diverted into the Gregory Ditch and taken to the proposed
storage location, the remaining water would freeze, and
protestants would have no water for their livestock in
the ·wintertime, (Tr. 127, 140, 146, 148). The court, in
Finding No. 9, found that if the diversion of water during freezing weather did interfere with livestock water,
the rights of protestants could be protected by proper
administration of the stream on a priority basis, and
that during most, if not all, years, water could be diverted and stored, without interfering with prior rights
( R. 41). The State Engineer testified that this prob15
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lem could be handled as a matter of administration
(Tr. 25).
This court has consistently held that the mere fact
that an application presents some problems of river administration is not grounds for rejection of the application. See Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir
Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108 (1943); and East Bench
Irr. Co., et ail, v. Deseret Irr. Co., et al, 2 Utah 2d 170,
271 P. 2d 449 (1954).
Again on appeal the Appellants have not continued
to urge this point, and we again will not burden the
record with a detailed discussion. We will note, however,
that there is evidence that some water might be diverted
without problem after October 15th (Tr. 73, 148); that
the runoff starts in March and April (Tr. 142); that Appellants' irrigation season doesn't start until May 15th
(Tr. 19, 150); that water probably could be put through
the Gregory Ditch a month or so before May 15th, and
transported without any problem of freezing, (Tr. 142).
One of the Appellants admitted that in some winters it
might be possible to divert all winter, (Tr. 149).
The only contention being made on the appeal now
in regard to injury to prior rights is the contention that
Appellants have some vested interest in keeping the
water in the basin and maintaining, in addition to their
decreed rights, a sub-flow through the entire area. This
is treated separately under Point IV, and we will deal
with that point below.

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C. Feasibility
The third issue reserved at the pre-trial was whether
or not the application is feasible. The point is argued at
length on appeal, and we now turn to a discussion of the
evidence on this point. The Appellants ignore uncontroverted evidence dealing with the question of feasibility.
First, the State Engineer, Mr. Lambert, testified that
for irrigation and ranching purposes, the project could
reasonably bear a cost of $100 per acre foot, ''possibly
more," and still be a feasible project, (Tr. 23). There
is no evidence to contradict this. The application (Ex.
D 4) is for 1,700 acre feet of water, and thus, if the
Applicants can complete an appropriation for that much
water, the project could reasonably bear a cost of
$170,000.
Secondly, the evidence, without contradiction, shows
that there is an existing ditch from the Middle Fork of
Beaver Creek to the East Fork of Beaver Creek, and with
very little work it would convey 7 cubic feet per second
(Tr. 75, 78). There is also an existing canal (the Gregory Ditch) from the East Fork of Beaver Creek to the
proposed reservoir site, and beyond, (Tr. 71). The
Gregory Ditch has an existing capacity of 30 cubic feet
per second. The trial court so found, (R. 38), and the
evidence sustains the finding, (Tr. 66-69, 87-79).
Neither of these existing ditches is used for irrigation purposes before May 15, (Tr. 74, 19, 150). In fact,
the decree provides that the irrigation season shall be
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from May 15th to October 15th, (Tr. 19). There is testimony from one of the appellants to the effect that the
spring runoff starts some years in March and April, (Tr.
142) and that the water could be taken through the Gregory Ditch until May 15th, without hurting anyone, (Tr.
142). There is also in evidence the U. S. G. S. daily
measurements showing the average flow of both the East
Fork and the Middle Fork of Beaver Creek from October 15th through the following May 15th, (Ex. 5, 6).
These were reviewed by the trial court, and in the trial
court's memorandum decision (R. 26), the court noted:
"For the period May 1st to May 14th, an analysis of the water flow records for the years 1949
through 1965 reflects average excess flow from
the Middle and East Forks of Beaver Creek over
and above the adjudicated rights, of 16.24 c.f.s.,
or 32.5 acre feet per day [which is the amount allowed for livestock water] was approximately
1,061 acre feet for said fourteen-day period.''
In addition to the foregoing, the Gregory Ditch was
enlarged throughout its entire length in about 1930 (Tr.
65), so that the water stored in the Hoops Lake Reservoir could be transported through it, (Tr. 71). The
Hoops Lake water is seldom used before July 1st,
(Tr. 71). Therefore, this excess capacity in the Gregory
Ditch is also available from May 15th to July 1st, which
includes the normal period of peak flows, as can be seen
from the daily flow records, (Ex. 5, 6), and the graphs
which were prepared therefrom, (Ex. 13). Specifically,
when the irrigation season starts for the decreed right
holders, there is maximum divertible flow of only 9.15
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c.f.s. in the Gregory Ditch (Tr. 88, and see also Ex. 8,
where decreed rights are listed under Gregory Canal).
Thus from May 15th until July 1st, there is approximately 21 c.f.s. of unused capacity in the Gregory Ditch.
As to this period of time, the trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, after analyzing the water flow charts
(Ex. 5 and 6) said:
''For the period from May 15th to June 30th,

an analysis of the water flow records for the years

1949 to 1962 reflects that the average daily flow
in the Middle and East Forks of Beaver Creek
exceeded adjudicated rights during thirty-six days
of said period, namely, May 23rd through June
27th. A computation of the excess daily flow reveals that the average excess per day for the thirty-six days was 33.7 c.f .s., which is equivalent to
67.4 acre feet per day, or 2426 acre feet for said
thirty-six days."
We think that this is of substantial importance on
the issue of f easihility, because substantial quantities of
water can he diverted from the proposed sources and
transported to the reservoir site without any enlargement of either of these ditches. It is obvious from the
court's memorandum decision that it placed substantial
weight on this evidence (R. 27).
Another factor dealing with the feasibility is that
the applicants own the land they propose to irrigate, (see
paragraph 12, Ex. D). The application also reveals that
the 1950 acres of land have a partial water right from
direct flow rights, and under the Hoops Lake Project (see
Explanatory Ex. D). Thus there should he no expense
for clearing the land and constructing a water distribu19
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tion system. There is also testimony that the applicants
own the rservoir site (Tr. 9).
The Gregory Ditch has been used by the Hoops Lake
Project for almost 38 years, (Tr. 65, 72). The present
applicants own 2,589 out of a total of 4000 shares in the
Hoops Lake Project, (Tr. 64). While the right to put
water in the Gregory Ditch was established for the Hoops
Lake Project water, this court held in Harvey v. Haights
Creek Irrigation Co., 7 Ut. 2d 58, 318 P. 2d 343 (1957),
that water can be placed in an existing canal from other
sources, unless this will cause damage to the servient
estate. Thus, right-of-way acquisition costs should be
minimal.
The language of the Utah Supreme Court in United
States v. District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
121 Utah 1, 238 P. 2d 1132, supra, is very apropos. The
court said there that the applicant should have his application approved so that he can experiment to see what
can be done. The court further said that if the applicant
is required at the approval stage to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he can beneficially use the
water without interfering with the rights of others, as
though this were a final determination of rights, it would
deprive him of an opportunity to experiment and demonstrate what he can do. The court said that such a system
would cut off the possibility of establishing many valuable rights. Because of this, the court indicated that
applications should be approved without requiring such
precise proof. With the approved application, the applicant here will be able to divert water through the existing
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ditches during the time when the capacity is unused, and
demonstrate by actual diversion and use the extent to
which, if any, these canals need to be enlarged.
The availability of this unused capacity, without any
expense, would alone justify under the cases the approval
of the application without any evidence concerning the
cost of enlarging the canals.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of showing that it
would be possible, at reasonable expense, to enlarge the
ditches, should this prove to be necessary or desirable,
we offered evidence on this point. The Appellants confine their argument to an attack on the figures of Mr.
Proffitt. The engineer who had been engaged to design
the project and testify on these cost figures had become
ill at the last minute, and was not able to appear at the
trial, (Tr. 9, 49). Mr. Proffitt had prepared some computations and exhibits dealing with the available water
supply, and he was asked, during the course of the trial,
(Tr. 108) to develop some normal costs for constructing
an earthen fill dam of the type contemplated by the
application and some normal cost figures for this area
for moving dirt to enlarge an existing canal. As we
will presently note, he did know normal costs, and we
think that we established through other witnesses that
the enlargement of the ditches would present no abnormal problem or expense.
Hubert Lambert, who is the present State Engineer,
and who has been with the State Engineer's office for 26
years (Tr. 18) testified that he has walked the entire
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length of the Gregory Canal from the point where it
diverts from the East Fork to the point beyond the
reservoir site where it empties into Indian Creek, (Tr.
21, 31). He was asked :
'' Q. Do you see any particular peculiar engineering problems in enlarging it [the Gregory
Ditch] unusual costs 1
''A. Well, no more than you get in any ditch.
Some of the ditch has areas where it has rather a
low slope, but it is not something that would be an
impossibility, no.
'' Q. Would it be unusually expensive to enlarge?
"A. Oh, I wouldn't think so." (Tr. 22)

On cross-examination he was asked to explain what
he meant by his earlier statement that the ditch could be
enlarged without unusual expense, and he said that he
didn't see any major engineering problem, and he would
think that it would be enlarged with normal expense,
(Tr. 41).
The evidence also discloses that the Gregory Ditch
has already been enlarged once as a part of the Hoops
Lake Project, (Tr. 71). This enlargement was made
in about 1930 (Tr. 65). The enlargement at that time
was for a similar amount of water - the Hoops Lake
Project is for 4,000 acre feet of water (Tr. 72) but only
one-half of this - or 2,000 acre feet - went through the
Gregory Ditch, (Tr. 73). The enlargement covered the
entire distance from the East Fork to our reservoir site
and beyond, (Tr. 71). Since the Hoops Lake Project
has already enlarged the Gregory Canal for 2,000 acre
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feet of water, it has been demonstrated that this can be
done. We have a comparable quantity of water available here (1700 acre feet). (Ex. D) In this regard it
should be remembered that the last enlargement was in
about 1930 (Tr. 65), and that the State Engineer had
walked the whole length of the canal, (Tr. 21, 31) about
ten years ago (Tr. 31). This was long after the Hoops
Lake enlargement, and at that time he saw no special
problem, and thought that the further enlargement could
be done at normal cost (Tr. 41). The Hoops Lake Project had also involved the building of a reservoir in this
same general area, and it has been in successful use for
about 38 years, (Tr. 65). Further, should there be any
problem with the site chosen, Section 73-3-3, U.C.A.
1953, permits the filing of a change application, changing the place of storage.
On the Middle Fork Mr. Hanks testified that he was
familiar with the existing ditch between the Middle Fork
and the East Fork; that he was the originator of the
Hoops Lake Project, and was familiar with the terrain
and the work done in enlarging the Gregory Ditch, and
that he thought that enlarging the ditch between the
middle and east forks would present less problems than
they had encountered in enlarging the Gregory Ditch,
Tr. 76). So with these two witnesses we did establish
that there would be no abnormal problems or expense in
enlarging these two canals. No evidence was offered to
contradict this.
Mr. Proffit was not totally unfamiliar with the area.
He hadn't walked the entire length of the ditch, but when
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he was asked how he knew what kind of material the
canal runs through, he said that in some places it is
gravel, soil; not too bad, but in other areas there are sidehills and big boulders. He was asked how he knew this,
when he hadn't seen it, and he said, "Because I have seen
the whole area up there. I haven't walked along the
canal. The ground doesn't change that much." (Tr. 105)
He was asked to compute the cost of enlarging the
existing canals in this area to the extent of 10 cubic feet
per second, (Tr. 103). He stated that the figure he used
was a conservative figure, and explained that this was so,
because he had assumed that the velocity of water in the
canal would he one cubic foot per second, (Tr. 103). On
cross-examination (Tr. 105) he again said that he knew
his figures on enlarging the canals were conservative,
even though he had not run a profile, "because I have assumed the minimum probable velocity of flow in that
canal, and, therefore, I'm assuming you are moving the
maximum amount of dirt." (Tr. 105)
Thus, starting out with the assumption that the
canal had a flat grade, which would require the removal
of a maximum quantity of dirt to create canal capacity,
he thought that 10 cubic feet of capacity could be constructed by removing 2,000 cubic yards of dirt per mile,
(Tr. 103). The costs, he thought, would be between 50
cents a yard and $1.50 per yard, so that the cost would
range from $1,000 a mile to $3,000 per mile, depending on
the terrain, (Tr. 103). On page 104 he was asked if his
figures were not purely speculative. He stated that on
the amount to be moved, ''I think my figures are con24
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servative." He was asked if by this he meant that it
might cost a lot more, and he answered, "No, I don't it might cost a lot less. I think my figures are high.'' He
was then asked how he knew that his figures were high,
when he hadn't run a profile, and he said that he had
assumed the minimum probable velocity, and, therefore,
he was assuming the moving of a maximum amount of
dirt, (Tr. 105).
Mr. Proffitt had also, in 1966 and 1967, designed two
earthen dams. One had been actually constructed, so
that he knew the construction costs. On the other he
had just completed his design and cost estimate (Tr.
101). He said that the only type of dam he would construct in this area with soil conditions as they are would
be an earthen dam with a core trench, plus carafine and
recompacting (Tr. 107). He was asked, "How do you
know what kind of a tie-in you would make, since you
haven't seen the site," and he answered, "That's the
only kind I would make on a dam of this size," (Tr.
107). Again he indicated that the dirt could be moved
at a cost of $1 per yard, (Tr. 101) and that a dam 300
feet long and 30 feet high and 10 feet wide at the top
would take between 15,000 and 20,000 cubic yards, depending on the size of the core trench (Tr. 101). He
allowed $1.50 per yard for the dirt, tie-in and spillway,
and stated that at $1.50 per yard there would be plenty
of money (Tr. 102). The application showed that the
dam is 30 feet high, (Ex. D 4) and Mr. Hanks testified
that he has seen the site, and that the dam would be
about 300 feet long (Tr. 8). Again there was no conflicting testimony.
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We submit that this was a sufficient prima facie
showing on feasibility. In summary, we showed, without contradiction, that there is substantial unused capacity in the existing canals, and that this capacity is
available for substantial periods of time during the high
spring runoff period. Experimentation of the type discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in United States v.
District Court, supra, may very well demonstrate that
little, if any, enlargement is desirable. Certainly without any enlargement, substantial quantities of water can
be taken to the place of storage. True, if the application
should be denied, ''only when it is clear that the applicant
can establish no valuable right," this application should
be approved, for some water can assuredly be appropriated without any enlargement of either canal. We
have the testimony of Mr. Hanks (who had seen both
canals and had worked on enlarging the Gregory Ditch),
and of Mr. Lambert, (who had walked the entire distance of the Gregory Canal), that there would be no
abnormal or unusual expense in enlarging the ditch. Mr.
Proffitt then testified that if the six-mile total length of
both ditches (Tr. 76) has to be enlarged on a flat grade,
thus causing the removal of the maximum quantity of
dirt, the enlargement could be done for a maximum cost
of $3 1000 per mile, or a total of $18,000 (Tr. 103). A
reservoir of the only type Engineer Proffitt would
construct in this area (Tr. 107) could be constructed at
a maximum cost of $30,000, (Tr. 102). The project
has an economic value of $170,000. The applicants own
their own land. It is already being irrigated. Certainly
it does not, therefore, affirmatively appear that there is

26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

no reasonable cause for believing that the project is
feasible.
No applicant should be required at the approval
stage to expend the money to completely design a dam,
spillway, and other works, and to dig test holes and expend the other substantial amounts of money to assure
that he has a reservoir site. Such an expenditure of
money is not warranted initially, because he cannot know
at the time he files his application whether or not it will
be rejected on some other valid ground, such as nonavailability of water. Further, if the proposed site is
on the lands of some third party, he may not be able, as
a matter of law, to obtain the necessary rights of way to
do the test work without an approved application. The
statute clearly contemplates that this will be considered
in detail by the State Engineer at a later date, for by
Section 73-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, the applicant is required,
before he starts construction, to submit detailed plans
and specifications and to have the State Engineer approve them. Mr. Lambert testified that this is the normal
procedure followed by his office (Tr. 24).
POINT III
THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE WERE FRAMED
BY A VALID PRE-TRIAL ORDER.
As noted by the court in its Memorandum Decision
(R. 24), a pre-trial order was entered in this case. The
parties at the pre-trial stipulated that the issues of fact
to be tried were as follows :
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"1. Whether there is probable cause to believe that there is unappropriated water in East
Beaver Creek and Middle Beaver Creek tribu. of Henrys Fork River, available for' divertanes
sion, storage and use, as proposed in Application
No. 34965.
"2. Whether water can be so diverted, stored
and used without injury to or conflict with the
prior rights of the p1anitiff s.
'' 3. Whether the plan proposed by the above
numbered application is physically and economically feasible.''
As we have demonstrated above, evidence fully adequate to support the trial court's findings was adduced
on each of these three issues. However, Appellants now
contend that notwithstanding their stipulation at the
pre-trial, the Respondents (who are the applicants) had
the duty of proving every other factor set forth in Sec.
73-3-8, U. C. A. 1953. This contention is made for the
first time on appeal.
It is true that Sh,ields v. Dry Creek Irrigation Company, 12 Utah 2d 98, 363 P. 2d 82, holds that on an appeal
from a decision of the State Engineer, the applicant must
adduce evidence on all factors noted in Section 73-3-8,
U.C.A. 1953. However, that case does not hold that where
the parties have had a pre-trial and agreed upon the
issues of fact to be tried, the applicant is required to
disregard the pre-trial order, and prove every fact which
could have been put in issue under Section 73-3-8.
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision noted
the requirements of Section 73-3-8, U.C.A. 1953, and then
28
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stated that there had been a pre-trial order entered on
stipulation of the parties agreeing on the issues to be
tried. The issues agreed upon are quoted, and the court
then noted:
"From the stipulation, as set forth in the pretrial order it is apparent that the plaintiffs do not
question that the defendants as applicants have
the financial ability to complete the proposed
works, nor do they question that the application
was filed in good faith, and do not assert that
the application was for purposes of speculation or
monopoly." (R. 25)
This is again expressly noted in Conclusion of Law
No. l, (R. 42).
The Memorandum Decision was filed on January 11,
1968, and the Conclusions of Law were entered January
26, 1968. On February 19, 1968, Appellants filed a motion for new trial (R. 44). We direct the court's attention to the fact that this motion did not question the
above conclusion of the trial court, nor raise any issue
concerning the applicants' :financial ability and good
faith. The new trial motion is general in terms, except
for the contention that the court erred in :finding that the
project was feasible (R. 44).
In Point III of Appellants' brief, they urge that Respondents should have offered evidence that Respondents
had the financial ability to complete the project, and that
Respondents filed the application in good faith. We submit that applicants cannot enter into a stipulation at
the pre-trial agreeing to limit the issues of fact to be
2!1
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tried to the three issues specified in the pre-trial order,
and then successfully contend for the first time on appeal
that Appellants should have disregarded the pre-trial
order, and introduced evidence on factual issues not reserved in the pre-trial order.
Because these issues were not set up in the pre-trial
order, no particular effort was made to offer evidence to
meet these issues. Even so, the record contains substantial evidence on these matters. The application was introduced in evidence as an exhibit (Ex. D 4). It recites
in paragraph 11 that the application proposes to provide
water for 1,950 acres of land. It also recites in the Explanatory that the lands to be irrigated are already being
irrigated with direct flow rights, and that they also have
some storage water from Hoops Lake. The application
form asks in paragraph 12 whether the applicants own
the land which they propose to irrigate, and the application states that the applicants do own their own land. We
thus have in the application (Ex. D 4) a statement that
the applicants are the owners of 1,950 acres of irrigated
land.
The record also shows that these applicants are the
owners of 2,589 shares out of the 4,000 shares in the
Hoops Lake Project, (Tr. 64). That project is a larger
project than this one, in that it stores 4,000 acre feet
of water, (Tr. 71, 72), whereas the proposed project
would store only 1,700, (Ex. D 4). Mr. Lambert testified that stored water has a value for irrigation and
ranching of $100 per acre foot, (Tr. 22). Thus, the
2,589 acre feet of Hoops Lake water that these applicants
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own would have a value today of $258,900. There is also
evidence that two of the applicants own the proposed
reservoir site, (Tr. 9).
Insofar as the applicants are concerned, the record
reflects that Mr. Hanks and his son own 1,239 shares of
the Hoops Lake Project. The Hoops Lake Project was
constructed around 1930 (Tr. 65). Mr. Hanks was one
of the men who made the first filing on that project. He
has been in the ranching business all of his life, (Tr. 66)
and is now 70 years of age, (Tr. 67). He has lived on
the ranch he now operates for 50 years, (Tr. 71). Certainly this evidence shows that he is a man of substance
and stability, that he is interested in the area, and the
development of water, and negatives any possible inference that the application is speculative. The others also
own their own land (Ex. 4) and own direct fl.ow rights
and substantial stock in Hoops Lake, (Tr. 64).
Appellants point to the fact that Mr. Proffitt was
asked during the morning of the trial to make some computations on the cost of constructing a dam and the cost
of installing a ditch. It is true that Mr. Proffitt was asked
to do this on the day of the trial, (Tr. 108) but the inference Appellants seek to draw from this is unfair and
contrary to the record. Appellants stated (page 20 of
their brief) :
"When, as here, the evidence shows that Engineer Proffitt was hired to make certain engineering studies while the case was being tried, and
that he made the studies during the noon hour,
and testified shortly after noon, the good faith
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of the applicants might well be questioned.'' (Tr.
108)
The inference Appellants apparently seek to make
here is that applicants had done no engineering until the
day of the trial, and did not in good faith intend to
go ahead with the project. Appellants well know that
Respondents had engaged an engineer named Miller, who
designed the dam, and that Mr. Miller became ill, and
at the last minute was unable to attend the trial, (Tr. 9,
49, 111). There was also evidence that test holes had
been dug (Tr. 8), and that the abutment area had been
exposed down to solid material (Tr. 10). Thus, any inference that no planning had been done until the day of
the trial is re butted by the record.
We thus respectfully submit that this issue of the
Applicant's good faith and :financial ability was eliminated from the trial by the stipulation of the parties at
the pre-trial, and by the failure of the Appellants to raise
this matter in any fashion in the court below. We also
submit that notwithstanding the fact that no specific
effort was made to introduce evidence bearing directly
on this point, the record, nevertheless, shows that these
people are people of substance, who own their own land
and valuable existing water rights, they are long-time
residents of the area, and are processing the application in good faith. The mere fact that the engineer they
had engaged was ill, and couldn't come to the trial, thus
forcing either a continuance or an effort to develop other
cost figures the day of the trial simply doesn't raise the
suggested inference of bad faith.
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POINT IV
APPELLANTS HAVE NO VESTED RIGHT IN
THE NATURAL SUBFLOW OF WATER, AND
NO RIGHT TO KEEP THE PUBLIC WATER
IN THE NATURAL BASIN.
What the Appellants apparently contend by their
Point IV is that neither Schedule A, attached to the
pre-trial order, nor the decrees in Utah and Wyoming,
correctly define their rights. They want everything
awarded to them by those decrees, and then they want
all of the excess water from this source left undiverted,
so as to maintain a natural sub-flow or water table
throughout the area.
They cite no authority in support of this contention.
It would appear to be out of harmony with the express
holding of this court in Weber Basin Conservancy District v. Gailey, 8 Utah 2d 55, 328 P. 2d 175, (1958). On
rehearing, the court stated the issue as follows:
"Does an owner of land adjacent to a stream
have the right to insist that the stream continue
to flow in its natural channel undiminished, for
the purpose of maintaining lateral support to
keep percolating waters within the soil of his
land~

The court in a detailed opinion holds that he has no
such right.
EDWARDW. CLYDE
ROLAND R. WRIGHT
DALLIN W. JENSEN, Asst.
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
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